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CITIZENSHIP AND THE LAW OF
TIME IN THE UNITED STATES
ELIZABETH F. COHEN∗
INTRODUCTION
Who is entitled to become a United States citizen? In an age of
mass migration, unease over the question of citizenship attribution
has led to fierce debate about naturalization rules. On every occasion
in recent history that Congress has held hearings about whether to
create a pathway to citizenship for its undocumented population,
many in the United States have actively lobbied against offering even
a liminal status for long-term resident non-citizens. Such
disagreement reveals deep normative ambivalence about
immigration. As a nation, we have never entirely agreed on who
deserves to be a citizen.
In this Article I will use the constitutional and legislative history
of citizenship and naturalization rules in the United States to make an
argument that we have a long and well-defined history of according
American citizenship to people based, in large part, on a temporal
rule of citizenship. This rule identifies moments and durations of time
that, along with other traits, qualify people for citizenship. The Article
describes the history of temporal rules of citizenship and, in so doing,
illustrates why these principles of citizenship are ideally suited for
making determinations of citizenship under conditions of normative
disagreement that are complicated by administrative challenges. In
particular, the Article will point to the way in which time can
represent a wide array of the norms that even vastly divergent
ideologies associate with citizenship. Time can simultaneously
represent assimilation, civic knowledge, social connection, loyalty, and
many more citizenly traits and experiences. Because time is associated
with an unusually wide array of citizenship norms, temporally based
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rules of citizenship forge compromises between conflicting founding
ideologies. Of most relevance to the subject of this Article is the fact
that temporal rules circumvent quandaries such as disagreement over
who deserves to be a citizen. This potential for bridging normative
divides makes temporal rules of citizenship unusually powerful
governing instruments. At the same time, temporal rules also ensure
the smooth functioning of a large-scale state committed to basic
liberal egalitarian norms. Unlike money or property or even work,
time is equally available to all people. It proceeds at the same rate
regardless of one’s ascribed characteristics, social class, or any other
subjective traits. Using measures of time as a means of assigning
citizenship rights circumvents the pitfalls inherent in most qualitative,
subjective, and often inegalitarian measures of fitness for citizenship.
I. ELIGIBILITY FOR CITIZENSHIP
Citizenship rules in all nation-states generally fall into two types.
The first, jus soli, assigns citizenship based on physical presence,
1
usually at the time of birth. The second, jus sanguinis, assigns
citizenship based on blood lineage, asking one to prove a relative is or
2
was a citizen. These principles use either physical presence or blood
lineage to represent traits such as allegiance, fidelity, and connection
to the polity or its people. In some cases the rules will be applied in
conjunction. For example, citizenship is assigned to people born in
3
United States territory and to children born abroad to American
4
parents.
A third rule is quietly in operation alongside, and sometimes in
cooperation with, these two rules. It is a temporal rule of citizenship
that associates fitness for membership with specific amounts of time. I
call this jus temporis. Jus temporis is a temporal principle of
citizenship that allows states to use dates and measurements of
calendrical or durational time to confer part of or the entire
citizenship bundle upon individuals and groups. Different types of
temporal measurement apply in different circumstances. These
temporal measures are not the only variables for determining
someone’s readiness for citizenship but they are critical. Jus temporis

1. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 942 (9th ed. 2009).
2. Id. at 941.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States . . . .”).
4. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1401 (West 2013).
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produces the probationary periods of time that every nation-state
demands aspiring citizens wait prior to naturalizing. It can also be
observed in more local contexts, such as the requirement that legal
permanent residents reside in the United States for a minimum of five
years prior to applying for discretionary state benefits, such as
5
Temporary Aid for Needy Families. A rule of jus temporis is even at
the heart of rules creating an age of consent, in which the full rights of
citizenship are bestowed on persons after they have reached a
predetermined age. In each of these three examples, jus temporis, in
the form of a temporal threshold or a duration of time, serves to
represent the development of qualities, relationships, and skills that
are associated with citizenship.
Much like jus soli and jus sanguinis use land and blood to
represent the deeper and intangible kinds of qualities that a society
deems central to citizenliness, temporal rules of citizenship use time
in an analogic fashion. In other words, time has come to be used to
6
represent core values and norms associated with citizenship. This is
especially true because the social meanings of time are quite elastic,
offering a wide range of possible values that can be represented using
time. Time therefore comes to have special agency in the negotiation
of compromises among different citizenship norms. As this article will
show, time’s elasticity allows it to represent a full array of the core
norms that even vastly divergent ideologies associate with citizenship.
II. TIME AND SOVEREIGNTY
There are several overarching reasons that time figures so
prominently in naturalization rules. The first has to do with the
establishment of sovereignty. Although sovereignty over a territory
and its inhabitants is generally associated with the rule of law and
geographical markers, sovereignty is also established at a specific
time.

5. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 § 402, 8
U.S.C.A. § 1612 (West 2013).
6. As George Lakoff and Mark Johnson describe, societies around the world exhibit a
common reliance on the value of time for the purpose of creating the building block metaphors
that are essential to any system of communication. George Lakoff & Mark Johnson, Conceptual
Metaphor in Everyday Language, 77 J. PHIL. 453, 456–57 (1980).
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In the Anglo-American tradition, the precedent for the
establishment of citizenship, and consequently naturalization, is
7
Calvin v. Smith, otherwise known as Calvin’s Case. Calvin’s Case also
establishes the practice of using a date to distinguish between subjects
8
of the King and outsiders. In 1608, Edward Coke recorded the
decision in Calvin’s Case stating that persons born in Scotland after
the ascent of James I to the throne in 1603 (postnati) were to be
considered subjects in his allegiance, while those born prior to his
ascent (antenati) were not. The explicit outcome of this decision was
to make the date of James’s ascent a political boundary between
subjects and those of the various lesser political statuses that existed
at the time. The 1603 boundary was as stark as any line on a map or
border in the earth. Although it could be crossed—naturalization
could bring the antenati into the political body—even people who
were “naturalized” had different political statuses than those born
9
into it.
The authoritative use of time to make a legal distinction between
antenati and postnati is hardly unique to the early modern or the
Anglo-American context. Nor is it only deployed in states that use
place of birth to assign citizenship. The establishment of sovereign
borders following the breakup of the Soviet Union into its constituent
republics offers a striking recent instance of the use of specific dates
to carve out citizenries, in many cases in concert with both jus soli and
10
jus sanguinis. In those cases, dates were specifically deployed not

7. (1608) 77 Eng. Rep. 377 (K.B.); 7 Co. Rep. 1a.
8. In the literature on citizenship the choice of a date at which all persons present in a
territory are offered citizenship is frequently referred to as the “zero option.” I am avoiding use
of this term because I believe it is misleading. In most cases where the term “zero option” is
used, exceptions (temporal, racial, and otherwise) exist that ensure that segments of the
population do not actually receive citizenship on the same terms as others. For further
discussion of the “zero option,” see Rainer Obliger, Ius Sanguinis, in 1 IMMIGRATION AND
ASYLUM: FROM 1900 TO THE PRESENT 342, 342–46 (Matthew J. Gibney & Randall Hansen eds.,
2005). I am indebted to Kathrine Barnes for drawing my attention to the phrase “zero option”
citizenship rules.
9. See JAMES H. KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608-1870
37–42 (1978) (discussing Craw v. Ramsey, (1670) 124 Eng. Rep. 1072, 1075 (C.P.), which
distinguished between natural-born and naturalized Irishmen in recognizing priority in
inheritance of an English earl’s estate).
10. These are instances of a larger category of citizenship attribution issues associated with
“restoration” or “restitution.” See Piotr Korcelli, Current Issues Related to Citizenship and
Immigration: The Case of Poland, in FROM ALIENS TO CITIZENS: REDEFINING THE STATUS OF
IMMIGRANTS IN EUROPE 121, 199 (Rainer Bauböck ed., 1994); Andre Liebich, Introduction:
Altneuländer or the Vicissitudes of Citizenship in the New EU States, in CITIZENSHIP POLICIES IN
THE NEW EUROPE 21, 21–37 (Rainer Bauböck et al. eds., expanded and updated ed. 2009).
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only to mark the assertion of each individual republic’s sovereignty,
11
but also to identify the boundaries of their citizenries. Latvia,
Estonia, and Lithuania famously excluded from citizenship large
numbers of people who had been born in their territories during the
Soviet era and who were present during separation, but whose
parents and grandparents had not been present prior to the moment
12
at which the Soviet occupation began. In these cases the use of
precise dates is essential to identifying the sovereign boundaries of
each state, as well as the boundaries that demarcate citizens (postnati)
from non-citizens (antenati). Citizenship laws in Bulgaria and
Romania as well as the seven former Yugoslav republics followed
similar patterns, establishing rules that singled out residence during
specific time periods. For example, in Macedonia citizenship was
accorded to an individual
if on 6 April 1945 he or she had municipal membership on the
territory of the People’s Republic of Macedonia; if before 30 June
1948 he or she made a statement in the presence of the town or
regional council where he or she resided that he or she wished to
be a citizen of PR Macedonia; or, if on 28 August 1945 he or she
was a resident outside the territory of the FPR Yugoslavia but
before 6 April 1941 his or her last municipal membership was
somewhere on the territory of the People’s Republic of
13
Macedonia.

Very similar provisions can be found in almost all of the citizenship
laws instituted following the breakup of the Soviet Union.
Although this article focuses on the Anglo-American context, it is
worth noting that rules of jus temporis were also invoked in the
dismantling of the British Empire. Date-based jus temporis was
14
applied in the transition of Hong Kong from British rule. Similarly,
despite its association with strong rules of jus sanguinis, Germany’s

11. See Jeff Chinn & Lise A. Truex, The Question of Citizenship in the Baltics, 7 J.
DEMOCRACY 133, 133–34 (1996) (observing that these states defined citizenship following
independence in 1991 in terms of citizenship at the time of Soviet annexation in 1940).
12. See id. at 134–36 (describing the stringent post-independence naturalization
requirements these states, especially Latvia and Estonia, imposed on residents who had
immigrated during the Soviet era).
13. Ljubica Spaskovska, Macedonia’s Nationals, Minorities and Refugees in the PostCommunist Labyrinths of Citizenship 5–6 (University of Edinburgh School of Law, Working
Paper No. 2010/05, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
1914398.
14. JAMES M. CARROLL, A CONCISE HISTORY OF HONG KONG 239–51 (1987) (discussing
“[b]ecoming Hong Kongese”).

COHEN 10.20.2013 (DO NOT DELETE)

58

10/21/2013 7:58 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 8:1

Basic Law (the German constitution) extends citizenship to persons
present or related to those present as of December 31, 1937, as well as
to anyone expelled between January 30, 1933 and May 8, 1945, as long
15
as those persons were also present after May 8, 1945. Temporal
boundaries are not just the product of moments of establishment and
dissolution, they are also implicated in rules that states adopt after
establishment. For example, persons born in the Panama Canal Zone
16
after 1904 have long been considered American citizens. Similarly,
the Jones Act granted United States citizenship to Puerto Ricans in
17
1917.
Time holds singular political potential for the exercise of
sovereignty. It is common to all political subjects, and yet it necessarily
has a distinctive meaning within every society. Accordingly, time is
both universal and particular. It can appear neutrally scientific and
impartial while simultaneously attaching to a group’s deepest
normative traditions. Benedict Anderson has famously pointed out
that shared temporal context, facilitated by the regularization of clock
18
time, was crucial to the development of the modern nation-state.
More recently, Thomas M. Allen illustrated this process at work in
eighteenth-century America, writing that America made “time the
19
medium for an effusive nationalism.” It comes as no surprise then
that time is so important to sovereignty and subjectivity. Time can
apply to almost any kind of action or relationship. Time is also
understood, if differently so, by all people. And despite its universal
qualities, time also takes on a distinct meaning in any society. Few

15. GRUNGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG]
[BASIC LAW], May 23, 1949, BGBI. I, art. 116 (Ger.).
16. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, tit. 3, ch. 1, § 303, 66 Stat. 163, 236 (codified
as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1403 (2006)) (“Any person born in the Canal Zone on or after
February 26, 2014 . . . whose father or mother or both at the time of birth of such person was or
is a citizen of the United States, is declared to be a citizen of the United States.”).
17. Jones-Shafroth Act of 1917, ch. 145, § 5, 39 Stat. 951, 953 (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 733
(2006)).
18. BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTION ON THE ORIGIN AND
SPREAD OF NATIONALISM 194–95 (1983). Anderson discusses the imposition of the Napoleonic
calendar as representative of the movement to synchronize the shared experience of an entire
people. He argues that this was critical to the development of nationhood among disparately
situated people in newly forming political bodies. Id. passim.
19. THOMAS M. ALLEN, A REPUBLIC IN TIME 23 (2008). Writing about the effect of the
French Revolution on European identity, Peter Fritzsche proposes a dualist thesis about
European identity in which shared context and differentiation are produced by the “specific
temporal identity not unlike the feeling of generation, and separated or decoupled . . . from
their forebears two or three generations earlier.” PETER FRITZSCHE, STRANDED IN THE
PRESENT: MODERN TIME AND THE MELANCHOLY OF HISTORY 53 (2004).
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other things have the potential to be applied to politics in such
specific and general ways.
III. TIME AND CITIZENSHIP NORMS
Although time is crucial to establishing sovereignty, it is also a
useful tool for connecting political norms and citizenship practices, as
demonstrated by the development of United States citizenship laws.
American jurists did not adopt the Calvin’s Case rule of jus soli
wholesale. What transformed this precedent in the United States
context were notions of consent that Coke rejected, but which were
20
integral to the separation of the colonies from Great Britain. Coke
had established allegiance as perpetual: it began at birth and could
not be abjured. By contrast, Lockean consent was not ascribed; it was
only conceivable once a child reached maturity (the age of consent)
21
and it could be foresworn. Putting this Lockean ideal into practice,
the founders, legislators, and jurists in the United States constructed a
consensual government in which citizenship could be subscribed
within the space of a reasonable period of time. This marriage of
consent and jus soli was made possible because United States
citizenship revised the temporal reasoning found in Calvin’s Case. In
so doing, they ensured that full members of the United States polity
would be consenting citizens of the republic rather than loyal subjects
of the king.
The insertion of consent into common law citizenship norms in
the United States—which required and employed a different
understanding of time—began in 1804 with a series of court decisions
establishing a set of understandings about who was an American
citizen. The Supreme Court’s earliest words on the subject of the
American antenati came in the case M’Ilvaine v. Coxe’s Lessee
22
(McIlvaine). Leading up to this confrontation had been a series of
20. Peter H. Schuck and Rogers M. Smith illustrate in careful detail how consent came to
dominate American conceptions of citizenship. E.g., PETER H. SCHUCK & ROGERS M. SMITH,
CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT: ILLEGAL ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN POLITY 42–43, 49
(1985); ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S.
HISTORY 81–82 (1997). However, even the nation’s most purely consensual rules of citizenship
attribution required physical presence and therefore some element of jus soli is omnipresent.
21. See KETTNER, supra note 9, at 54–55; SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 20, at 23–25;
SMITH, supra note 20, at 78–80. On expatriation, see Gerhard Casper, Lecture at the University
of Chicago Law School: Forswearing Allegiance (May 1, 2008).
22. (McIlvaine I) 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 280 (1805). The case was reargued in 1808. McIlvaine v.
Coxe’s Lessee (McIlvaine II), 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 209 (1808). “McIlvaine” will be used to refer to
both McIlvaine I and McIlvaine II.
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squabbles between the British and Americans about the exact date on
which United States sovereignty, and hence citizenship, was
established (1783, upon the conclusion of the Treaty of Paris, as the
23
British contended, or 1776, as the Americans contended). As was
true of many of the early citizenship cases, McIlvaine involved a
24
question of whether an antenatus could inherit land. Perhaps
marking a hangover from the pre-democratic membership defined in
Calvin’s Case, property ownership, particularly rights associated with
inheritance of property, was a proxy for citizenship rights far more
25
than was the right to vote. In McIlvaine, Daniel Coxe’s allegiance
and eligibility for citizenship were brought into doubt by virtue of the
26
fact that he had been a loyalist during the Revolutionary War. The
arguments on each side were complex, pointing to where Coxe
resided at specific intervals marked by the declaration of war in 1776,
the signing of Jay’s Treaty in 1794, and interim legislative acts in New
Jersey that explicitly enumerated the acts that would henceforth be
27
considered treasonous. Rather than using a single date, as Calvin’s
23. KETTNER, supra note 9, at 186–87. The difference of opinion between the British and
the Americans is directly noted in Inglis v. Trustees of Sailor’s Snug Harbor, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 99,
187–88 (1830) (Story, J., concurring). It may be useful at this point to recall that the period
under examination roughly corresponds to the period during which French authorities were
playing all manner of games with time, including the imposition of an entirely alien calendar for
which time began with the French Revolution.
24. McIlvaine I, 6 U.S. at 210.
25. KETTNER, supra note 9, at 117–18. On the relative openness of the franchise, see
generally RONALD HAYDUK, DEMOCRACY FOR ALL: RESTORING IMMIGRANT VOTING
RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES (2006); Ronald Hayduk, Noncitizen Voting Rights: Extending
the Franchise in the United States, 92 NAT'L CIVIC REV. 52, 57–62 (2003); Jamin B. Raskin,
Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical, Constitutional and Theoretical Meanings of Alien
Suffrage, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1391, 1394 (1993); Sarah Song, Democracy and Noncitizen Voting
Rights, 13 CITIZENSHIP STUD. 607, 608 (2009).
26. McIlvaine I, 6 U.S. at 334.
27. The Court noted:
The inquiry which the jury is directed to make, by the act of the 18th of April, 1778, in
order to lay a foundation for the confiscation of the personal estates of these fugitives
is, whether the person had, between the 4th of October, 1776, and the 5th of June,
1777, joined the armies of the king of Great Britain, or otherwise offended against the
form of his allegiance to the state. The 7th section of this law is peculiarly important,
because it provides not only for past cases, which had occurred since the 5th of June,
1777, but for all future cases, and in all of them, the inquiry is to be whether the
offender has joined the armies of the king, or otherwise offended against the form of
his allegiance to the state. During all this time, the real estates of these persons
remained vested in them; and when by the law of the 11th of December, 1778, the
legislature thought proper to act upon this part of their property, it was declared to be
forfeited for their offences, not escheatable on the ground of alienage. This last act is
particularly entitled to attention, as it contains a legislative declaration of the point of
time, when the right of election to adhere to the old allegiance ceased, and the duties
of allegiance to the new government commenced.
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Case had, American jurists began to rely on durations of time to
establish citizenship. Ultimately the Court declared Coxe to be a
citizen by virtue of the fact that he had tacitly given consent through
residence in New Jersey at the time of its founding (the adoption of
the state constitution) all the way to the point at which New Jersey
passed laws defining its citizenship requirements. The Court held:
Daniel Coxe lost his right of election to abandon the American
cause, and to adhere to his allegiance to the King of Great Britain;
because he remained in the state of New-Jersey; not only after she
had declared herself a sovereign state, but after she had passed
laws by which she pronounced him to be a member of, and in
28
allegiance to, the new government.

In the language of McIlvaine, Coxe’s citizenship existed because
he lost his right to elect not to be a citizen, or to adhere to his
allegiance to the King, by residing in New Jersey during this period of
29
time. A period of time—rather than the single moment of time
identified in Calvin’s Case—became a proxy for reasoned consent.
Thus, the Court identified three interwoven principles of American
citizenship: consent (“right of election”); jus soli (“remained in the
state of New-Jersey”); and jus temporis (“not only after she had
30
declared herself a sovereign state, but after she had passed laws”).
The mutually constitutive relationship between time, place, and
consent is fleshed out in even more useful detail in the decision
written by Justice Thompson in Inglis v. Trustees of Sailor’s Snug
31
Harbor, as well as Justice Story’s frequently cited concurrence. Inglis
involved an even lengthier hashing out of both the moment at which
United States sovereignty commenced and the appropriate timeframe
in which consent, or election, could take place. In the decision, Justice
Thompson stated:
The rule as to the point of time at which the American antenati
ceased to be British subjects, differs in this country and in England,
as established by the courts of justice in the respective countries.
McIlvaine II, 8 U.S. at 213.
28. Id. at 212.
29. See KETTNER, supra note 9, at 194 (discussing the corollary point that, prior to states
passing treason laws, individuals were not prosecuted for treason even though Congress had
defined the crime, implying “that individuals were generally allowed to choose sides before that
time” (citing BRADLEY CHAPIN, THE AMERICAN LAW OF TREASON 72 (1964))).
30. McIlvaine II, 8 U.S. at 212. Jus sanguinis is an implicit part of the decision as well,
because if Daniel Coxe had not been Anglo-Saxon, his standing likely would have been denied
on the basis of his racial origins.
31. 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 99 (1830).
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The English rule is to take the date of the treaty of peace in 1783.
Our rule is to take the date of the [D]eclaration of
32
[I]ndependence.

On the subject of durational time and consent Thompson noted
that “[t]o say that the election must have been made before, or
immediately at the [D]eclaration of [I]ndependence, would render the
33
right nugatory.” In this way he gave voice to a belief repeated
throughout antenati cases, asserting that a government that imposed
itself at a specific date was arbitrary and non-consensual while one to
which citizens could subscribe within the space of a reasonable period
of time was consensual.
Justice Story’s concurrence reaffirmed this relationship between
durational time and consent by stating that consent requires reason
34
and reason occurs in durations of time. Story also acknowledged that
the precedent of McIlvaine contradicted his precise conclusion with
respect to when allegiance could commence. Story claimed the British
occupation of New York that began on September 15, 1776 effectively
35
muddled any allegiances claimed to begin on July 4, 1776. He
therefore strenuously argued that 1783 be regarded as the cutoff date
36
for the period of election. Still, Story emphasized that the nature of
the American Revolution made it crucial that individuals be allowed
an appropriate duration of time in which to choose their allegiance.
He wrote:
The general doctrine asserted in the American courts, has been,
that natives who were not here at the [D]eclaration of
[I]ndependence, but were then, and for a long while afterwards
remained, under British protection, if they returned before the
treaty of peace, and were here at that period, were to be deemed
citizens. If they adhered to the British crown up to the time of the
37
treaty, they were deemed aliens . . . .
32. Id. at 121.
33. Id.
34. See id. at 159–60 (Story, J., concurring) (noting that following the American Revolution
people were “entitled to make their own choice, either to remain subjects of the British crown,
or to become members of the United States” and that this choice was “to be made within a
reasonable time”).
35. Id. at 164–65 (Story, J., concurring) (“If he was born after the 15th of September 1776,
and his parents did not elect to become members of the state of New York, but adhered to their
native allegiance at the time of his birth, then he was born a British subject.”).
36. Id. at 170–71 (Story, J., concurring) (“[T]he treaty of peace of 1783 released all persons
from any other allegiance than that of the party to whom they adhered, and under whose
allegiance they were then, de facto, found.”).
37. Id. at 161 (Story, J., concurring).
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Beyond his assertions about specific moments, Story also drew a
connection between time and reasoned consent.
This choice was necessarily to be made within a reasonable time.
In some cases that time was pointed out by express acts of the
legislature; and the fact of abiding within the state after it assumed
independence, or after some other specific period, was declared to
38
be an election to become a citizen.

What Story’s words tell readers is that consent requires reason, and
reason is measured in durations of time.
Even during the war years we can find decisions that illustrate a
conception of “volitional allegiance” that embraced the idea of a
39
temporal duration in which people could elect their own citizenship.
For example, Chief Justice McKean wrote that, following a civil war,
the minority have, individually, an unrestrainable right to remove
with their property into another country; that a reasonable time
for that purpose ought to be allowed; and, in short, that none are
subjects of the adopted government, who have not freely assented
to it. What is a reasonable time for departure, may, perhaps be
40
properly left to the determination of a court and jury.

Similarly, North Carolina passed a law in November 1777 allowing
41
citizens a period of election lasting until October 1778. Writing for
the Supreme Court of North Carolina, Justice Johnston upheld the
42
law in Stringer v. Phillips, stating that “[t]he Assembly meant to
retain and actually reserved the power of restoring to such the rights
which to them once belonged, if within the limited time they would
43
apply for that purpose.” Delaware followed suit by stretching its
44
waiting period for full rights of office-holding to five years.

38. Id. at 160 (Story, J., concurring).
39. The term “volitional allegiance” is from KETTNER, supra note 9, at 173–209.
40. Respublica v. Chapman, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 53, 58 (1781).
41. Act of 1777, ch. 17, § 2, reprinted in 24 THE STATE RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA
124 (Walter Clark ed., 1886) (ordering the confiscation of property of all persons that were
absent from North Carolina on July 4, 1776 or who had left since that time and were still absent
unless at the next General Assembly, to be held on October 1, 1778, “such Person[s] shall . . .
appear, and be by the said Assembly admitted to the Privilege of a Citizen of th[e] State”).
42. 3 N.C. (Cam. & Nor.) 158 (1802).
43. Id. at 159.
44. Act of June 11, 1788, ch. 174, § 1, reprinted in 2 LAWS OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
922 (1797) (“[N]o person who shall become . . . a subject of this state, by virtue of this act, shall
be appointed to any civil office, or eligible as President, Member of the Privy Council or
General Assembly, unless such person . . . resided within this state five years previous to such
election or appointment . . . .”).
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Perhaps the most illustrative, Georgia’s citizenship act affirmed
what the judicial decisions cited in the preceding paragraphs
45
asserted. Following the war, Georgia moved from a xenophobic
system that had singled out Scottish immigrants for exclusion, to rules
that required an oath, affirmation of character, and a twelve-month
46
waiting period. Minors who left the country for three or more years
for their education would, upon their return, be considered aliens for
the purposes of civil, military, and legislative or executive office for
47
the exact length of their absence. By instituting such a policy,
Georgia effectively created a temporal algorithm that both expressed
and “solved” the problem of Americanization by taking into account a
person’s age, length of absence, and period of re-immersion in
48
American society, economy, and politics.
To sum up: In Calvin’s Case, the moment of birth represented the
commencement of a lifelong obligation (allegiance) to the sovereign
49
for his protection. McIlvaine, Inglis, and their counterparts in state
courts further developed the temporal logic of Calvin’s Case in two
important respects. First, as is commonly acknowledged, they
predicated citizenship not just on allegiance, but also on consent,
50
expressed as “right of election.” Coke’s conception of jus soli seemed
arbitrary to the colonists, who replaced the model of conquest with a
51
“right of election” in determining the citizenship of the antenati. To
do so required the second innovation. In the course of making
decisions with respect to the antenati, the Court became increasingly
strident about the fact that electing citizenship required a period of
time during which reason could occur and culminate in consent. The
time was demarcated by two dates rather than a single moment in

45. See generally Act of Feb. 7, 1785, ch. 28, reprinted in 19 THE COLONIAL RECORDS OF
STATE OF GEORGIA 375–78 (Allen D. Candler ed., 1911) (“Whereas the many advantages
and peculiar blessings which this State enjoys, may induce foreigners to apply for a participation
thereof, and whereas it is the intention of the Legislature to confer those benefits on all such as
may apply and do merit the same.”).
46. Id.at 376.
47. Id. at 378.
48. The judges writing these decisions had a plethora of far more explicit and concrete
means for affirming consent, some of which also bore the authority of having been drawn from
the common law tradition. Oaths of allegiance, for example, were far more direct, concrete, and
active expressions of consent for a population that had been divided against itself. See generally
JEAN BODIN, ON SOVEREIGNTY (Julian H. Franklin ed. & trans., 1992).
49. Elizabeth F. Cohen, Jus Tempus in the Magna Carta: The Sovereignty of Time in
Modern Politics and Citizenship, 43 PS: POL. SCI. POL. 463, 463–66 (2010).
50. McIlvaine II, 8 U.S. (2 Cranch) 209, 212 (1808).
51. KETTNER, supra note 9, at 193.
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time (as would be the case in a royal accession such as James’s in
1603). Over and over again, judges writing decisions about the
antenati explicitly called for “reasonable” periods of time in which
52
persons could elect to become citizens. These durations were, in fact,
times of actual critical political reasoning during which people had
information (such as newly adopted constitutions and social and
political context) available in order for them to make enlightened
53
decisions about their consent. It was durational time that allowed
the American form of jus soli to avoid the arbitrary quality of Coke’s
54
perpetual allegiance. In fact, the decision to assign durational time a
political value stood in direct opposition to Blackstone’s related
writing on the subject, which expressly stated that natural allegiance
was due from the moment of birth because infants were incapable of
protecting themselves and natural allegiance “[could not] be forfeited,
55
cancelled, or altered by any change of time, place, or circumstance.”
This contrast between Coke’s jus soli and the early American focus on
56
consent was noted in McIlvaine, among other cases. As formulated
by American judges, consent to citizenship occurs within a reasonable
duration of time and within a specific territory. Because of this,
52. E.g., Respublica v. Chapman, 1 U.S. 53, 58 (1781) (“[A]ll of the writers agree, that the
minority have, individually, an unrestrainable right to remove with their property into another
country; that a reasonable time for that purpose ought to be allowed; and, in short, that none
are subjects of the adopted government who have not freely assented to it.”).
53. Here the word “enlightened” is a deliberate reference to the phrase “enlightened
understanding” that Robert Dahl uses to describe one of his key prerequisites for democratic
decision-making. See generally ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS (1989).
54. Note that the idea of constituting consent through time and place upon the creation of
a polity is directly analogous to Locke’s formulation of consensual citizenship in an existing
polity, which also invokes durational time. Locke singles out the duration of time in which a
child born into a polity matures, and acquires the capacity to give consent. Thus birthright
citizenship is somewhat of a misnomer, because children do not receive most rights of
citizenship until they reach the age of consent. This is true of jus soli as well as jus sanguinis, as
evidenced by Schuck and Smith’s discussion of Burlemaqui’s belief that jus sanguinis allowed
children a “provisional political membership at birth” and that they could elect full citizenship
upon reaching maturity. SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 20, at 44–46. Indeed, time is critical to
conferring legitimacy on the kind of “tacit consent” that Locke discusses and that is integral to
social contractarian democracy. A. John Simmon, Tacit Consent and Political Obligation, 5
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 274, 279 (1976). Although tacit consent is a silent consent, that does not
necessarily imply that tacit consent is entirely passive. Justice Story went so far in his Inglis
concurrence as to claim that durational time and residence together formed an “overt act or
consent . . . to their [citizens’] right of election.” Inglis v. Tr. of Sailor’s Snug Harbor, 28 U.S. (3
Pet.) 99, 159 (1830) (Story, J., concurring) (emphasis added). For a recent discussion of whether
jus soli is consensual, see generally Matthew Lister, Citizenship, in the Immigration Context, 70
MD. L. REV. 175 (2010). On Locke’s discussion of the political status of children, see generally
IAN SHAPIRO, DEMOCRACY’S PLACE (1996).
55. SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 20, at 43.
56. E.g., McIlvaine II, 8 U.S. at 211–13.
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McIlvaine allowed the full incorporation of antenati who were
ineligible for full subjecthood under the jus soli rules laid out in
Calvin’s Case.
What occurs over time is more than an extended mutual “I do” to
citizenship. As the text of these decisions indicates, time permitted
would-be citizens to engage in acts of political reason that must occur
57
prior to consent. The consensus that emerged from these decisions
was that, in living in the time of election and the sovereign territory of
the new country, antenati created what I would term a “lived consent,”
which was neither truly active nor completely tacit in exchange for
their citizenship. Just as one’s birthplace or blood represents civic
membership or volkish connection, among other things, time too
comes to represent intangible qualities and acts of great significance
to citizenship. The development of citizenly qualities and the
performance of citizenly acts demands more of aspiring citizens above
the passive acceptance implied by tacit consent and yet is not so
demanding as to be inherently exclusionary.
At this point, two points about jus temporis have been fleshed out:
First, the use of measured time to establish sovereign boundaries has
been illustrated in Calvin’s Case as well as in the United States
precedents that cited Coke’s commentaries. In Calvin’s Case we see
the invocation of a single date in order to establish a sovereign
boundary around a citizenry (or proto-citizenry, as the individuals in
question were subjects and not citizens). Second, the use of measured
time to represent an intangible political act, in this case reason, has
also been illustrated.
Reason is not the only crucial act, trait, or value that time can
represent. Other processes and traits that were relevant to citizenship
are linked to these temporal durations. James Kettner’s read on the
Court’s consistent use of time to demarcate the act of electing
citizenship is that “[i]t took time to dissipate the bitterness felt toward
57. As David Noble points out, the “state of nature” anthropology that Europeans had
developed by the time of the Enlightenment treated the nation as natural and rational and
everything outside its boundaries as unnatural and irrational. However, some outsiders were
deemed capable of reason, hence a period of time in which to engage in political reason was a
non-metaphorical breach in an otherwise seamless border that guarded the nation from the
threat posed by the irrational. Thus, persons reared in aristocratic societies could engage their
capacities during probationary durations of time and become American citizens. Persons who
were incapable of reasoning were not given this opportunity; even as these people occupied the
same land as the American nation and were governed by its laws, they were excluded from
temporal opportunities for inclusion. DAVID W. NOBLE, DEATH OF A NATION: AMERICAN
CULTURE AND THE END OF EXCEPTIONALISM xxvii (2002).
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natives or longtime residents who took up arms against their
58
neighbors or who otherwise aided the enemy.” If we look beyond
these court cases to political debates about citizenship and
naturalization, more substantive statements about the purpose of jus
temporis reveal two further points: First, time held a diverse but
limited array of normative meanings in the minds of founders and
early American legislators; second, these legislators established a
process through which durations of time that represented these norms
could be exchanged, in this case for political status.
Not only was American-style democratic citizenship virtually
unprecedented, so too were its levels of immigration. As even a casual
observer of American history knows, the ability to attract newcomers
was essential to the survival of the young nation. In turn, survival was
also dependent on finding a means with which to politically transform
these newcomers into citizens in ways that were harmonious with the
nation’s political underpinnings.
Prior to the American Revolution, in 1740 Parliament had created
a naturalization procedure for aliens who settled in America that
required applicants to have resided in the colonies for at least seven
59
years, without being absent more than two consecutive months. Most
colonies had procedures for naturalization that were adopted and
adapted by the states. Directly following the American Revolution,
individual states incorporated naturalization procedures into their
constitutions. Pennsylvania and Vermont identified character, an oath
of allegiance, and a specified period of residence as prerequisites for
60
naturalization. North Carolina required an oath of allegiance and
61
one year of residency. New York required only that the person be a
state resident, take an oath of allegiance, and renounce any other

58. KETTNER, supra note 9, at 203.
59. British Naturalization Act of 1740, 13 Geo. II, c. 7 (Eng.) (providing that after June 1,
1740, “all persons born out of the legience of His Majesty, His Heirs, or Successors, who have . .
. or shall inhabit or reside for . . . seven years or more in any of His Majesty’s colonies in
America . . . shall be deemed, adjudged, and taken to be His Majesty’s natural-born subjects of
this Kingdom”).
60. PA. CONSTITUTION of 1776, § 42 (requiring “good character,” an “oath or affirmation
of allegiance,” and “one year’s residence” for naturalization, but requiring a two-year period of
residence to be eligible for election as a representative of the state); VT. CONSTITUTION of 1777,
ch. 2, § 38 (same).
61. N.C. CONSTITUTION of 1776, § 40 (requiring foreigners to take an oath of allegiance
and reside in the state for at least one year to “be deemed a free citizen”).
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62

allegiances. Other states passed acts describing naturalization
63
procedures as well.
The bulk of early debates over political incorporation occurred at
one of two points: during the Constitutional Convention of 1787 when
the matter of prerequisites for national office-holding was discussed,
and a few short years later when naturalization for newcomers was
64
debated. At the Constitutional Convention, discussion was devoted
to two significant questions related to the citizenship of newcomers.
First, delegates argued about how many years of residence after
naturalization new citizens should be required to wait before
65
becoming eligible to hold office in either the House or the Senate.
Some thought no waiting period would be just while others went so
far as to advocate for a seven-year bar for the House and a fourteen66
year bar for the Senate. Second, the delegates took up the larger
issue of whether the federal government would have a monopoly on
the power to grant naturalization. Lack of uniformity in this regard
was of concern to the founders, who believed that consequential
forms of confusion would arise if the states continued to impose
67
divergent rules about something as fundamental as citizenship. The
United States would need its own procedures for handling
immigration once a sovereign state had been established. This ensured
that citizenship and naturalization were among the earliest and most
fiercely contested subjects taken up by delegates in 1787, and again
when the newly formed legislature took up and passed the aptly

62. N.Y. CONSTITUTION of 1777, § 42 (requiring a person to settle in the state, take an oath
of allegiance, and “abjure and renounce all allegiance and subjection to all and every foreign
king, prince, potentate, and State in all matters” to be eligible for naturalization).
63. It is worth observing that, unlike the court decisions discussed earlier, legislative
naturalization acts linked durational residence more to the franchise of voting than to the right
to own and bequeath property to one’s heirs. In several cases (arising in Pennsylvania, Vermont,
Maryland, and Virginia) the probationary period was explicitly designated for voting and officeholding rights; all other rights of citizenship were accorded based on oaths of allegiance.
KETTNER, supra note 9, at 214–15.
64. See generally JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
OF 1787 (Ohio Univ. Press 1966). The debates from June 15, August 9, and August 13, 1787 are
of particular relevance. See id. at 118–21, 414–25, 437–50.
65. KETTNER, supra note 9, at 224–27 (analyzing the debates).
66. Id.
67. In 1782, James Madison wrote to Edmund Randolph that he was worried about “the
intrusion of obnoxious aliens through other States” and that he believed a “uniform rule of
naturalization ought certainly to be recommended to the States.” Letter from James Madison to
Edmund Randolph (Aug. 27, 1782), available at http://etext.virginia.edu/etcbin/toccernew2?id=DelVol19.xml&images=images/modeng&data=/texts/English/modeng/parsed&tag=pu
blic&part=68&division=div1.
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named Uniform Rule of Naturalization in 1790. There was serious
disagreement about whether creating a uniform rule for
naturalization would trample state rights or ensure egalitarian
69
treatment for new immigrants.
Bearing out the larger point made earlier, durational time
immediately came to the fore as the primary means of effecting
uniformity in citizenship while also taking into account the concerns
of skeptics who sought to reserve this power for the states. William
Patterson introduced the idea of bringing “harmony” to the
70
patchwork of state naturalization rules on June 15, 1787. However,
the periods of time recommended by different key players varied
substantially. The committee reports recommended a three-year
waiting period before allowing a naturalized foreign-born person into
71
the House of Representatives and a four-year period for the Senate.
Madison’s record of the deliberations shows intense disagreement
over whether the waiting periods were so long as to “give a tincture of
illiberality to the Constitution” and “discourage the most desirable
72
class of people from emigrating.” George Mason demanded a sevenyear period for the House in order to prevent “foreigners and
adventurers” from making American law and to ensure adequate civic
73
knowledge for all lawmakers. Mason even worried about foreign
74
conspiracies to purchase influence in the United States. Gouverneur
Morris and Charles Pinckney advocated a fourteen-year wait for the
75
Senate.

68. See Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103.
69. See KETTNER, supra note 9, at 239–40 (summarizing the arguments on both sides).
70. MADISON, supra note 64, at 128.
71. Rutledge delivered the committee report on August 6, 1787. Article IV, Section 2
stated that members of the House of Representatives “shall be of the age of twenty-five years at
least; shall have been a citizen in the United States for at least three years before his election;
and shall be, at the time of his election, a resident of the state in which he shall be chosen.” Id.
at 386. Article V, Section 3 stated:
Every member of the Senate shall be of the age of thirty years at least; shall have
been a citizen in the United States for at least four years before his election; and
shall be, at the time of his election, a resident of the state for which he shall be
chosen.
Id. at 387.
72. Id. at 419.
73. KATE MASON ROWLAND, THE LIFE OF GEORGE MASON 1725-1792 149 (1892).
74. Id.
75. MADISON, supra note 64, at 418.
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In Morris’s appeal for “reason” on the subject, he analogized
between making offices available to recently naturalized foreigners
and reports that some tribes of Indians had offered their daughters
76
and wives to strangers as signs of hospitality. Furthermore, he
believed the loyalty of foreigners would always be to their first
77
governments. Nativists such as Elbridge Gerry and Pierce Butler
ultimately sought to exclude the foreign-born from holding public
78
office entirely. Butler believed that not only were foreigners likely
still “attached” to their native governments, but simply unable to
79
abandon their very different notions of government. Oliver
Ellsworth disputed this, arguing that it would discourage the very
80
sorts of immigrants that the country ought to recruit for admission.
81
Franklin and Madison concurred. James Wilson wryly pointed out
that he, as a foreign-born person, would be prevented by such a rule
82
from serving in a body that he had taken part in crafting. Wilson also
demonstrated that foreigners had made valuable contributions during
83
the Revolution.
The final result of the negotiation was a nine-year waiting period
84
for the Senate and a seven-year waiting period for the House.
Candidates for the office of President were initially only required to
85
have been a resident for twenty-one years; this was later amended to
86
require that they be natural-born citizens. Although it represents too
serious a digression to explore further at this juncture, it should not
pass unnoticed that questions of the political status of naturalized
persons were hardly the only matters to which the delegates applied
answers drawing upon temporal algorithms. The very matter of the
timing of elections in the upper and lower houses, as well as term
limits, evince the same core belief: Durations of time (e.g., term
lengths) could be inserted into equations along with other variables
(for example the number of delegates and the respective powers of

76. Id. at 421.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 418.
81. Id. at 419–20.
82. Id. at 420.
83. Id.
84. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2–3.
85. Presidential Eligibility, CONSTITUTION SOCIETY, http://constitution.org/abus/pres_elig.
htm (last updated July 1, 2013).
86. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
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the two houses) to produce virtuous, effective, democratic
governance.
These debates continued within the federal legislature. One of the
first acts of the new Congress was to pass a bill that detailed how the
federal government’s power to naturalize new citizens could be
87
exercised. Just as their judicial counterparts engaged in the task of
determining how specific moments in time would divide citizens from
non-citizens, legislators argued over what durational time meant and
how it could be used incrementally both to include and exclude
newcomers. To read the debates over the Uniform Rule of
Naturalization is to come face to face with an almost obsessive
concern with the meaning of specific durations of time for
88
citizenship. The legislature worried equally about the dangers of
admitting people into political enfranchisement immediately upon
arrival and, alternatively, in a progressive but piecemeal fashion after
passing temporal thresholds. All of the worries and aspirations of the
representatives—their concern about foreign influence and purchase
of offices, of creating inequalities among the population, of what
people with foreign attachments might accomplish, of becoming an
illiberal society—were expressed by arguing for different durational
residence requirements for newcomers. The sheer volume and range
of discussion about the meaning of time, the fairness of temporal
rules, and the effect time has on the division of citizenship into semicitizenships is surprising, perhaps in part because contemporary
academic attention has focused on the relative importance of jus
sanguinis, jus soli, and consent to early immigration laws. Just as
birthplace, blood lineage, and consent each represent intangible
qualities necessary for citizenship, the legislators quoted above
thought that time could measure abstract traits.
A significant point of contention attached to the terms of the
Uniform Rule of Naturalization centered on whether an oath of
allegiance would suffice to qualify someone for naturalization or
whether a probationary residence time period was necessary. A
87. See Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103.
88. Most scholars of citizenship who have studied the Rule of Uniform Naturalization
attend to its presumption of jus sanguinis, pointing out that racialized restrictions were so
ingrained that the discussion of the Act did not include deliberation over whether non-whites
could naturalize. See ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP
IN U.S. HISTORY 153 (1997); Barbara Welke, Law, Personhood, and Citizenship in the Long
Nineteenth Century: The Borders of Belonging, in The CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN
AMERICA 345, 346–48 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008).
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consensus quickly emerged that some sort of probationary period was
89
in fact important to demand of would-be citizens. Once one stops to
consider that other means of measuring the traits of good citizens
exist (such as loyalty oaths, tests, and property ownership, each of
which had appeared in many of the individual colonies’ rules about
90
incorporation), it is striking to observe that the legislative debates
over the Uniform Rule of Naturalization and the related rules that
followed its passage focus almost exclusively on how many years
immigrants ought to wait before they could naturalize. The consensus
on making newcomers wait for citizenship is all the more notable in a
91
context where new citizens were so actively sought and needed.
Parsing these debates makes evident the degree to which linking
intangible values such as loyalty and civic incorporation to durational
time, measureable in precise increments by clocks and calendars,
facilitated the development of an algorithmic formula for the
extension of rights to foreign-born persons. The concept of a
probationary duration was not an American innovation. It can be
traced back to Roman laws pertaining to the status of newly (and less
92
newly) conquered people. However, the English common law
precedents to which Americans turned for guidance in creating their
own citizenship rules did not allow for the full naturalization of
93
newcomers. American legislators advocating probationary periods
prior to naturalization referred to the Roman practice of requiring
probationary periods to ratify the practice, but their justifications for
the probationary period make reference to the qualities and values of
American citizenship rather than the authority of any predecessor.
The congressmen debating the Uniform Rule of Naturalization
referred to a diverse yet limited set of values that they believed time
represented. Like Coke and the American judges who would later
89. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1146–58 (Joseph Gales ed., 1790).
90. See KETTNER, supra note 9, at 179–80 (discussing the naturalization rules adopted by
several colonies).
91. Kettner points out that early America witnessed a “chronic labor shortage” that could
be remedied only by actively enticing new arrivals. Id. at 107.
92. See A. N. SHERWIN-WHITE, THE ROMAN CITIZENSHIP 61 (2d ed. 1973) (describing the
process of Roman conquest and incorporation as one that required “a probationary period
during which these peoples were brought under the influence of Romano-Latin discipline and
culture”); see also RANDALL S. HOWARTH, THE ORIGINS OF ROMAN CITIZENSHIP 4–5 (2006)
(detailing the founders’ consultation of Roman sources during the drafting of the Constitution).
93. See KETTNER, supra note 9, at 37–42 (noting that naturalization implied significant
differences between naturalized and natural born subjects, which was made explicit in Ramsey,
where it was determined that Irish antenati who had been naturalized were still aliens in
England).
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draw on his ideas, some legislators identified probationary time
periods prior to naturalization as a means of measuring “fidelity and
94
allegiance.” But allegiance, which treats the loyalty of citizens as a
debt incurred from the protection of a sovereign, is only one value
that the participants in the debate associated with probationary
periods. Thomas Hartley, for example, noted that “an actual residence
of such a length of time as would give a man an opportunity of
esteeming the Government from knowing its intrinsic value, was
essentially necessary to assure us of a man’s becoming a good
95
citizen.”
Other advocates of a probationary time period, including James
Madison, connected the amount of time an immigrant is in residence
with understanding the value of citizenship itself, rather than just
96
understanding the government and laws. Similarly (though with a
different emphasis), Representative Theodore Sedgwick of
Massachusetts also connected a probationary time period with
shedding “prejudices of education, acquired under monarchical and
aristocratical governments [that] may deprive [potential citizens] of
that zest for pure republicanism which is necessary in order to taste its
beneficence” and, taking this one step further, with forms of civic
97
knowledge that will make them good citizens. Representative James
Jackson of Georgia wanted “to see the title of citizen of America as
98
highly venerated and respected as was that of old Rome.” Jackson
stated: “I am clearly of the opinion, that rather than have the common
class of vagrants, paupers, and other outcasts of Europe, that we had
better be as we are, and trust to the natural increase of our population
99
for inhabitants.” He went on to insist that a period of residence was a
conduit for obtaining testimonials to the character of persons seeking
100
citizenship. He thought we must test the propriety and decency of
101
every potential citizen.

94. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1147.
95. Id. at 1147–48.
96. See id. at 1150 (quoting Madison saying, with regard to naturalization, “it is to increase
the wealth and strength of our community; and those who acquire the rights of citizenship
without adding to the strength or wealth of the community are not the people we are in want
of”).
97. Id. at 1156.
98. Id. at 1152.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1153.
101. Id.
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Besides the length of the probationary period, other subsidiary
temporal issues were raised. For example, a debate ensued over the
importance of continuity in time: Could probationary periods that
were interrupted disqualify someone from meeting the standard for
102
citizenship? White went so far as to argue for denationalizing
103
citizens who left and stayed abroad for a specified length of time.
Even as many supported the idea of a probationary period, a
number of influential congressmen also recognized that it would be
both constitutionally and morally problematic to legislate the creation
of semi-citizenships according only partial rights to some persons.
James Madison, William Smith, and Elias Boudinot were particularly
104
outspoken on this topic. Madison voiced concerns that merged the
normative with procedural questions, asking whether a probationary
period that sliced up citizenship into semi-citizenships would be
unconstitutional, or at a minimum antithetical to the egalitarian
105
foundations of the Constitution. Representative William Loughton
Smith of South Carolina asserted that a progressive rule of
naturalization (according some rights upon arrival and various others
after specified lengths of residence) went against the charge to create
106
one rule of uniform naturalization. Even Jackson, who deeply
distrusted extending American citizenship too widely, referred to
Blackstone’s commentaries to make the point that citizenship cannot
be conferred progressively or piecemeal (except the right to hold
107
office). Additionally, Page argued that European nations that
required longer time restrictions did so because they were more
108
bigoted and prejudiced against foreigners/neighbors. This likely
contributed to the fact that the Uniform Rule of Naturalization Act
109
required only a two-year period of residence prior to naturalization.

102. See FRANK GEORGE FRANKLIN, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF NATURALIZATION
UNITED STATES 42 (Arno Press, Inc. 1969) (1906) (“Uninterrupted time remains
significant to the naturalization process. Legal permanent residents of the United States may
not leave the country for extended periods of time while seeking to naturalize.”).
103. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1149.
104. In fact, the Constitution itself had created semi-citizenships on all sorts of bases,
including temporally defined restrictions on the election of the foreign-born to Congress
described above. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2–3.
105. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1149–50.
106. Id. The issue of creating different forms of citizenship, some with lesser and greater
rights was a sensitive one for many who regarded separation from Great Britain as an act of
defiance against the lesser status of the colonists in the empire. See id.
107. See id. at 1158.
108. Id.
109. See Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103, 103 (requiring candidates to
IN THE
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The probationary period of the Act in effect allowed people not
born with American citizenship to exchange two years of their time
for the status of citizen. The crafters of the bill were aware that they
were instantiating such a process. Hartley actually makes a direct
reference to the fact that time has a political exchange value,
excoriating states in which men could become citizens immediately
110
upon arrival for making citizenship too “cheap.” And the appeal of
temporal algorithms equating time-in-residence with qualificationsfor-citizenship was so great that in the Naturalization Act of 1795,
only five years after the passage of the Uniform Rule of
Naturalization, advocates of a longer probationary time period
111
succeeded in replacing the two-year threshold with a five-year term.
Furthermore, foreign-born persons were ordered to declare their
112
intent to naturalize three years prior to their admission, thus
marking another important temporal boundary for prospective
citizens. It is interesting to note that the parties who supported the
new restrictions held otherwise politically divergent opinions and had
113
very different reasons for supporting the change. In fact, increasing
the probationary period was one of the few issues agreed upon by the
114
representatives discussing the Naturalization Law. By the time
115
alienage (as opposed to naturalization) legislation came onto the
agenda in the form of the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, the
116
threshold had been raised to fourteen years. Thus later discussions
of amending the durational waiting period for citizenship were now
complicated by the existence of the Naturalization Act of 1795 and its

reside in the United States for two years to be eligible for naturalization).
110. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1148.
111. Naturalization Act of 1795, ch. 20, § 1, 1 Stat. 414, 414 (requiring candidates to reside
in the United States for five years to be eligible for naturalization).
112. Id.
113. KETTNER, supra note 9, at 240. Kettner claims that Jeffersonians were generally
interested in excluding “merchants and aristocrats” while Federalists at the time were more
concerned by threats to political stability. Id.
114. See id. (“[B]oth Federalists and Jeffersonian Republicans could agree on the
desirability of tightening the government’s naturalization policy.”). This supports the thesis that
relying on durational time as a means to represent values in politics brokers compromises of the
sort required by liberal democracies, under whose auspices equal justice must be meted to very
differently situated persons.
115. Alienage law differentiates laws governing the treatment and rights of non-citizens
living in the United States and is distinct from both immigration law and naturalization law.
LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY
MEMBERSHIP 222 (2006).
116. Naturalization Act of 1798, ch. 54, § 1, 1 Stat. 566, 566.
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temporal declaration requirement of three years.
To summarize, the new Acts had to address: (1) aliens in the
United States prior to the adoption of the Constitution who were not
naturalized by a state law prior to the Uniform Rule of
Naturalization; (2) all aliens who might have been naturalized by the
Uniform Rule of Naturalization; and (3) those who had declared their
118
intent to become citizens by the Naturalization Act of 1795.
In short, the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 created three
119
different sets of antenati based on the two preceding probationary
time periods and the declaration time period. In order to institute a
new fourteen-year probationary period, Congress had to do
something about the potential citizens to whom earlier laws applied.
Although this was resolved relatively easily by grandfathering the
earlier arrivals under the earlier laws, it points to the very fragmenting
120
of citizenship that people like Smith had worried about. Not only
was citizenship being accorded piecemeal over a period of time, but
people who were otherwise similarly situated aside from having
arrived on different dates were being treated very differently. The
deliberations over the bill reveal that the men discussing it were
keenly aware of the fine line they walked as they sought to exclude
from the demos titled nobles and other persons with strong
aristocratic attachments, while advocating a temporal hierarchy of
121
immigrant statuses in the United States.
Debate over a probationary period continued through 1802, when
the duration was revised back to five years upon the urging of
Hamilton, among others. Hamilton wrote:
Some reasonable term ought to be allowed for aliens to get rid of
foreign and acquire American attachments; to learn the principles
and imbibe the spirit of our government; and to admit the
probability at least of feeling a real interest in our affairs. A
residence of at least 5 years ought to be required. If the rights of
117. Naturalization Act of 1795 § 1.
118. FRANKLIN, supra note 102, at 84.
119. Technically they were “arrived prior” rather than “born prior.”
120. See supra text accompanying note 106.
121. FRANKLIN, supra note 102, at 84–87. A non-trivial postscript to the passage of the
Alien Act of 1798 is the fact that it also specifies that the power to restrain or remove alien
enemy males applied to persons fourteen years or older. Act Respecting Alien Enemies, ch. 66,
§ 1, 1 Stat. 577, 577 (1798). This fourteen-year duration marked a final temporal boundary to the
population, on one side of which lay children without political standing, and on the other adults
who did possess standing. Although ages of majority and ages of license are significant instances
of jus temporis, they cannot adequately be addressed in this Article without a lengthy digression.
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naturalization may be communicated by parts . . . those peculiar to
the conducting of business and the acquisition of property, might
be at once conferred, upon receiving proof . . . of the intention of
122
the candidates to become citizens.

Once again, we find reason joined with the idea of consent and
egalitarian processes of political incorporation into citizenship.
IV. CITIZENLY TRAITS, EXPERIENCES, RELATIONSHIPS, AND
NORMS EXPRESSED IN DURATIONAL TIME
To defend the probationary period they sought, advocates of the
various positions identified above were forced to articulate a precisely
defined range of meanings that time could hold. Judicial language
linked durational time to consent, political reason, and the dissipation
of bitterness following the Revolutionary War. In my reading of the
naturalization debates, the congressmen involved in crafting the bills
variously suggested that time be used to represent the following traits:
allegiance; fidelity; valuation of the United States government; civic
knowledge; the degree to which prior allegiances had been shed; and
an intent to settle in the United States permanently.
Why were judges and legislators so confident that traits such as
loyalty, civic virtue, or familiarity could be represented using
durations of time? Recall that at the outset of this article, it was
pointed out that all principles of citizenship both carry some direct
123
meaning and hold much larger symbolic significance. Insofar as they
represent otherwise intangible personal qualities, rules of citizenship
are always translating abstract traits into concrete terms. This is as
true of jus temporis as it is of any other principles used to draw lines
between citizens and non-citizens. And yet, like each of the other
three principles—jus soli, jus sanguinis, and consent—jus temporis
exists as a political principle because it can accomplish something that
the other three cannot.
Of the qualities that were identified in the debates, experience,
knowledge/familiarity, and the shedding of prejudice seem intuitively
likely to develop over time. However, each can also develop as a
product of specific efforts and actions that are identified using means
other than durations of time. Experiences can be isolated events, for

122. ALEXANDER HAMILTON, 6 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 776–77 (Henry
Cabot Lodge ed., 1885).
123. See supra pp. 53–54.
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example military valor, marriage, and labor. Each of these events
can be described in primarily qualitative terms. Yet, those qualitative
terms are inadequate for the purposes of both administrative
efficiency and normative compromise.
Time’s abstract quality is of special relevance to liberal agencies
that seek to forge compromises between thickly situated democratic
norms and the impartial universalist aspirations of those liberal
125
norms. It allows people who are morally equal according to liberal
theory to become politically equal (or politically “more equal”) in the
eyes of a particular democratic polity. In theory, time is equally
available to people of all social classes, races, etc., as long as they are
considered moral equals. Historian Lynn Hunt describes the modern
time schema as a dimension that is “universal, homogenous, and ‘deep’
126
in the sense of stretching back very, very far in time.” This allows
time special agency in the negotiation of compromises among
different citizenship norms. Time can come to represent a full array of
the core norms that even vastly divergent ideologies associate with
citizenship.
CONCLUSION
I set out in this Article to demonstrate that a temporal rule of
citizenship is uniquely capable of brokering compromises among
disparate and sometimes even contradictory notions of citizenship. I
began by demonstrating that a rule of time is integral to the
establishment of sovereignty. Because time and sovereignty are
imbricated, the constitution of a sovereign demos is also likely to
invoke temporal rules, particularly with respect to naturalization laws.
United States constitutional jurisprudence about the establishment of
citizenship shows a heavy reliance on time to represent reasoned
consent. Our legislative debates about naturalization reveal less
consensus about the qualities that new citizens ought to demonstrate
and yet settle on a rule very similar to that of the Supreme Court:
Newly arrived citizens must wait a probationary period of time before
becoming eligible to naturalize.

124. See NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION
200–27 (2002) (discussing marriage and citizenship). See generally THEDA SKOCPOL,
PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE
UNITED STATES (1995) (discussing military service and citizenship).
125. See ELIZABETH COHEN, SEMI-CITIZENSHIP IN DEMOCRATIC POLITICS 95–149 (2009).
126. LYNN HUNT, MEASURING TIME, MAKING HISTORY 39 (2008).

COHEN 10.20.2013 (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

CITIZENSHIP AND THE LAW OF TIME

10/21/2013 7:58 PM

79

Once we recognize the importance of temporal rules to citizenship
they become apparent in myriad forms. The age of consent, which
confers citizenship on adults, is a temporal rule. Prison sentences that
deny criminals rights for specific durations of time are also temporal
rules. Time is both an administratively convenient and normatively
freighted way to represent our most deeply held—and sometimes
fiercely contested—beliefs about citizenship. Without question,
temporal rules will also continue to play a key part in settling thorny
citizenship questions that remain on the political horizon. Time
figured prominently in the 1986 immigration “amnesty.” Similarly,
temporal rules have already played a central role in the 2013
127
congressional immigration proposals and hearings. And given the
unique role of temporal rules in establishing sovereignty and
maintaining political accord, we can fully expect that temporal rules
will be a part of any future changes to naturalization and citizenship
laws that emerge beyond our current political horizon.

127. See, e.g., Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, Fixing our Broken Immigration
System so Everyone Plays by the Rules (Jan. 29, 2013), available at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/01/29/fact-sheet-fixing-our-broken-immigration-system-soeveryone-plays-rules; Charles Schumer et al., Bipartisan Framework for Comprehensive
Immigration Reform, C-SPAN, http://www.c-span.org/uploadedFiles/Content/Documents/
Bipartisan-Framework-For-Immigration-Reform.pdf. The waiting period for regularization and
citizenship has become central to the compromises being brokered between the Democrats and
Republicans trying to sponsor bipartisan immigration reform. One of the initial planks of the
Senate plan as well as the proposal issued by the White House involved sending undocumented
immigrants to the “back of the line” to wait for citizenship. After much public discussion of the
fact that there is no single line for Green Cards, President Obama amended his initial, more
punitive stance to include a limit of an eight-year wait for regularization.

